Not Like the Other
Firefighters will say that every fire they respond to is different. That is one of the first things that became apparent when the Wildland Fire Lessons Learned Center's Information Collection Team began talking to emergency responders during Southern California's 2007 fires: It was not like the 2003 fire siege. Firefighters said they experienced dramatic differences even between the fires that were burning simultaneously in 2007.
“Firestorm 2003,” as the media tagged it, was unprecedented at that time. More than 12,000 firefighters responded to 13 wildfires, located within five Southern California counties that eventually were contained at 745,190 acres. California's Office of Emergency Services reported that 3,641 homes and an additional 1,184 other buildings were destroyed. Suppression costs were estimated at $120 million. The most devastating result of the fires was the deaths of 22 residents and one firefighter.
Those interviewed for the “Lessons Learned Report” in 2003 said they believed that events on the magnitude of the 2003 fires would re-occur. Four years later, almost to the day, their prediction came true.
In a thank-you letter to all of the respondents to the 2007 event, CAL FIRE Chief Director Ruben Grijalva wrote, “Even though there were 23 fires burning at once, any firefighter can tell you that the conditions at each fire varied widely. Weather, terrain and visibility can vary erratically in Southern California. The sheer magnitude of the October fires was incredible, and the fires moved in ways experienced firefighters had never seen. In some locations, flames were advancing at an acre per second amid 80-mph wind gusts.”
The following was learned from the Wildland Fire Lessons Learned Center's initial impressions report, “Southern California Fires 2007: What We Learned, How We Worked.” The full report contains analysis of air operations, use of GIS systems, public information, communication, resource management, evacuations and re-entry, and fire suppression tactics and strategies in a complex fire behavior situation. Each section contains a summary of the lessons learned in each facet of fighting the 2007 fires.
On Sunday, Oct. 21, a predicted wide-spread Santa Ana wind event occurred over Southern California with predicted initial wind speeds of 50 mph. Ten fires quickly grew large, fanned by the strong winds. Commands for the fires were established locally. Large-scale evacuations began, while firefighters battled to protect homes in the wildland-urban interface. On Monday, Oct. 22, another seven fires that started grew large while local firefighters extinguished dozens of other fire starts. These seven would destroy several hundred more homes. Almost all of the large fires began in a 72-hour window, as opposed to 2003 when seven large fires began during a six-day period.
In addition to the 23 large fires that occurred, another 251 vegetation fires were extinguished by fire service personnel, before damage occurred, between Oct. 20-25, Grijalva said. The 23 large wildfires that occurred in a seven-county area were eventually contained at 518,021 acres. The number of responding firefighters from local, state and federal agencies totaled more than 20,000. Fire suppression costs of the combined local, state and federal agencies reportedly totaled about $100 million. The state's OES reported 2,180 homes and 927 other buildings were destroyed. Authorities estimate that half a million residents were evacuated from the path of the fires and seven people died. (For a visual comparison of the burned areas in 2003 and 2007 in San Diego County, see http://weblog.signonsandiego.com/multimedia/utmedia/071030fireweek.)
Beyond the statistics, several other differences were noted. In 2003, the Santa Ana winds rarely exceeded 40 mph. In 2007, they regularly were clocked at 70 to 80 mph. In 2003, state and federal agencies had not pre-staged resources for the possibility of wind-driven fires, but in 2007 many state and federal entities froze their off-duty personnel into preparedness and poised engines, aircraft and management teams in instant response readiness. In fact, during the most recent fires, CAL FIRE reported mobilizing more personnel and equipment in two days than they had in the whole six days in 2003. In 2003, many residents had not implemented defensible space requirements at their homes. But firefighters who defended whole communities during 2007 said many residents had met the 100-foot defensible-space needs, making protection possible.
One of the most important differences noted in 2007 was found in the analytical response to the potential of the 2007 fires. In 2003, respondents said they had difficulty making the transition from an all-out tactical to a strategic response. In 2007, they transitioned to a strategic response almost at once. Many respondents said they immediately recognized the fires quickly could maximize their resources and that relief may be distant — so they began pacing themselves early in the event, mitigating fatigue with steps as simple as getting their feet up off of the floor for a minute. They said they knew they “were in it for the long haul.”
Clearly, lessons learned from the 2003 Southern California fires had a significant impact on county, state and federal agencies and among residents in Southern California, because changes have been implemented. But interviewees for this report also noted several areas that should receive focused attention until, either through policy, training or equipment upgrades, these problems areas are resolved.
This report does not relate a complete history of the events or decisions made during the 2007 fires. It is a reflection of a broad sampling of representatives from as many agencies and organizations as possible who were working at a variety of roles, in several functions, on different fires. The report collects the themes that rose as common concerns among all of these respondents. Generally, the organization for this report was patterned from the 2003 Lessons Learned Report with some variation because some issues became either more or less prominent during 2007.
Local fire authorities considered much of their success in response to the 23 large fires of 2007 as being directly due to their situation awareness and preparedness. Steps they reported as being the keys to their success included maintaining a keen awareness of the weather while preparing to implement a reactionary plan in case of a fire. Most respondents for this report cited elements in a three-level approach, which they had established prior to the fires beginning. All of the respondents who were integral in initial response said they were successful because they had one or all of the following three factors in place:
Preplanned evacuations and trigger points for implementation;
Pre-staged engines, aircraft and fire-management personnel; and/or
Implementation of unified command with law enforcement in the initial-attack phase.
Several local fire officials, such as Orange County Fire Authority, said they had worked to begin a collaborative response among all of the agencies that would be responding long before the fires began. In one county, fire authorities reported they had researched what resources were available throughout the state and were able to move some Type-1 helicopters from out of state into position in Southern California. They also reported working collaboratively with the officials from four southern national forests to provide severity funding for extended staffing. Federal fire authorities checked in with CAL FIRE in an effort to develop “mirrored” plans and lists were compiled of available resources in the case of large-scale fire.
On every fire where unified command was established at the local level and involved law enforcement during initial attack, evacuations were successfully conducted. At one large fire, an incoming incident management team incident commander noted that local resources were not in unified command and that “they should have been.”
In one county, the local fire authority pre-staged the local IMT. They were able to do that based upon a predicted wind event and with funding from the state. Within six hours of ordering a national IMT, that team was beginning to set up an incident command post and initiate dialogue between county fire authorities and the national IMT.
Unified command already had begun in this county at the local level between the county fire authority and the sheriff's office. This cooperation began up to 24 hours before the fire started. In unified command, these two county authorities used a pre-approved evacuation plan for the communities (canyons) at risk. The sheriff's office identified that they would need at least five hours to effectively evacuate a canyon. The timing information was helpful to fire authorities in planning the fire response operations and coordinating the evacuation function. One county used an assistant sheriff for the unified commander role, and lieutenants from the sheriff's office as leaders for evacuation groups.
Unified command with law enforcement worked in reverse just as well. After the decision was made to repopulate the homes, the number of police officers needed decreased in one county from 140 to about 20. At that time, the sheriff's office unified commander dropped off of the organization and coordination with law enforcement reverted to the IMT's liaison officer ensuring a smooth transition.
In one county, a dislodged boulder knocked down a power pole and started a fire. An engine crew returning from another call discovered the fire and within minutes a team and 20 engines were called to the scene. A sheriff's deputy responding to the scene formed unified command with fire operations and because of previous work with the sheriff's office on an evacuation plan, the sheriff's office personnel immediately assumed their role and began evacuating residents in threatened areas. The earlier collaboration made it easier to work together, respondents said. Quick evacuation and road closures were instrumental in reducing public exposure and maximizing firefighter access to threatened homes.
The preplanned evacuation that the two agencies had worked on together included escape routes that had been identified during a previous fire nearby. Many instances of working off of a pre-planned template occurred at a tactical response level on fires throughout Southern California, but due to the constraints of this report, not all of them are included here. On one incident, it was reported that unified command was expanded to include all of the stakeholders for the jurisdiction, including utility and water authorities, as well as law enforcement and fire officials. All of the stakeholders were co-located at the incident command post and engaged in information flow activities and decision-making. The expansion worked well, respondents said, because decisions were made with more information immediately available.
Elected officials were not as well integrated into the planning process, respondents said. They noted that in the future they would seek out these representatives early on and integrate them into pre-planning sessions.
Pre-determining sites for use as incident command posts and key support facilities had been noted as lacking by respondents in the 2003 event. By 2007, the situation had changed dramatically. Many ICP locations were pre-determined and in every case it happened, it was considered a success. It was noted that military bases worked well for a large ICP, where it was also well supported. One challenge for the IMT was figuring out who was in charge on the base. The situation was resolved when the IMT requested a base representative who was instrumental in coordinating the ICP.
Area command rarely is used in Southern California because the state has several available incident management teams. Historically, the Multi-Agency Coordinating Group assumes the role of an area command team when the situation calls for one. The use of an ACT during the 2003 fires was largely considered a success. Many respondents then indicated they would want ACTs to be pre-positioned along with IMTs. But that did not occur for the 2007 fires.
Although Area Command Teams were called in during the 2007 fires, respondents indicated the teams were underused, possibly reflecting that local agency administrators were unaware of the capabilities of an ACT and how they can augment the MAC group. ACT members said that during the 2007 fires, coordination of the various incidents overburdened the MAC group and may have compromised their strategic focus. Management of large-scale multi-jurisdictional events is an area of expertise for ACTs. By vesting management of the 2007 fires in ACTs, the MAC group may have sustained a clearer strategic focus, respondents said.
When several IMTs are pre-staged, ACT members suggested that pre-positioning an ACT also is beneficial. Once in place, the ACT can assess the EOC's capabilities and mission because emergency centers throughout the nation differ in these respects. Providing a liaison to the EOC also is considered a function of the area command team, respondents said.
Interviewees recommended that instead of the MAC group running the morning conference call, as happened in this case, the agency administrators may have benefited from delegating that task to the area command. This was one example of how roles, responsibilities and authorities of ACTs and their relationships with the agency administrator and management of the IMTs should have been more clearly defined during the 2007 fires.
Coordination responsibilities between area command and agency MAC groups, expanded dispatch and the EOCs would have been clearer, respondents said, if the procedure had been for the incident management team to report directly to area command instead of reporting to the MAC group.
The command organization should be structured to maintain a reasonable span of control and unity of command, interviewees said. This structure improves information flow and provides for the effective use of available resources. These issues should be considered when agencies began ordering resources for pre-positioning. Advising National Interagency Fire Center personnel during the pre-positioning stage of an event also is recommended. Pre-positioning ACTs relative to the number of pre-positioned IMTs could have reduced the number of incidents requiring direct interaction with the MAC group. The span of control for agency administrators could have then been reduced, aiding the group's strategic focus.
Assigning roles and responsibilities among area command, jurisdictional agencies and emergency services is best accomplished through the use of delegations of authority, respondents said. Letters of delegation to ACTs and IMTs by the agency administration with jurisdiction should be used in the future. On this incident, the IMTs used their standard reporting process back to the MAC group and continued that relationship even after area command was established. This created conflicting direction, negatively impacting the unity of command.
Safety officers provided one of the most noticeable cross-functional influences during the 2007 fires. Their proactive initiatives, as in 2003, were noted from area command to division and crew levels.
At the beginning of one IMT's command, the safety officer said that working with Operations to create strategies, set priorities and develop objectives and tactics were the most effective tools available at that point. Considering past failures where wind switches had occurred and planning contingencies for those kinds of events assisted operations' fireline leaders in preventing “back-door blowouts.”
Although the early order for the team was critical, one safety officer noted, the result was having a well-planned incident action plan and not enough resources to implement it. Then, the fire evolved so quickly that resource accountability became extremely challenging. “As soon as you knew where things were and what they were doing, they had to move to somewhere else as the fire situation changed,” said one firefighter in the report. In this situation, focusing on big picture safety objectives and relying on the division supervisors for resource accountability and safe operations became the most effective role for the safety officer.
One safety officer noted the effectiveness of the host unit's in-briefing as being the catalyst for incident personnel working safely. He said that even during the briefing, structures were burning: “You could hear it on the radio.” The host unit's personnel anchored their talking points in previous events and presented the incoming team with real examples of what they did not want to have happen. They specifically “used stories from previous events that outlined negative outcomes they didn't want to see repeated.” The incident objectives that resulted from the in-briefing, the respondent said, drove all of the discussions with cooperating agencies. Decision-making became easier because the objectives were clear and when tough calls had to be made, referring to the objectives stabilized the process.
Safety officers said sometimes the most complex parts of the incident were not in the actual firefighting activities, but the management of the people the fires were affecting. The complexity resulting from the evacuation of residents and the continuous feeding of information to the public, media and political representatives frequently overshadowed firefighting activities. Media, it was mentioned, often misguided the public telling them, for example, that an evacuation had been lifted when in fact it had not. Many of the safety “hiccups” that occurred during the management of the fires were generated by political representatives and media.
As in 2003, when conditions on the fires changed so dramatically, often within minutes, individual initiative exercised by division supervisors, crew leaders, strike teams and nearly everyone on the line became critical. Firefighters responded to multiple, emerging fires when command, control and communications often were compromised or simply unavailable.
In these cases, crew leaders reported using a group size-up briefing before engaging during many of their responses. With firefighters of varying experience levels on the same crews, this use of a “tactical pause,” as it was called in 2003, was instrumental in ground-truthing the situation the crew was about to face. Interviewees said the pauses gave them time to consider the possible scenarios, establish trigger points and outline contingency plans. Firefighters of all experience levels could engage with high confidence levels and increased abilities in recognizing when conditions became unacceptable to continue working in.
On the other side of engagement, some respondents said independent action was ineffective. In some cases, law enforcement officers were using garden hoses on homes that were burning within sight of engine crews parked curbside who said they were waiting to be dispatched. In the minds of the law enforcement officers, intent was what was critical; acting with a good heart was key. Interviewees said, actions can be corrected, but failure to act cannot.
It's important to remember that:
- Communication and coordination responsibilities among incident command teams, area command teams, multi-agency coordinating groups and emergency operations centers should be made clear and widely shared.
- Assigning roles and responsibilities among area command, jurisdictional agencies and emergency services is best accomplished through the use of delegations of authority.
- Individual initiative guidelines for firefighters who may be “curbside waiting to be dispatched” while homes within their sight are becoming compromised, should be addressed.
- The continuing support for differing work-shift schedules between federal, state and county agencies disrupts safe and effective staffing for field operations.
- Preplanning evacuations and trigger points for their implementation, pre-staging resources and equipment and using unified command with law enforcement during initial attack were instrumental in the rapid response to the fires and the safe evacuation of thousands of people.
The complete report can be downloaded at www.wildfirelessons.net/documents/2007_SO_Cal_ICT_FINAL_REPORT.pdf.
Jonetta T. Holt is a public-information officer for the Eastern Arizona Incident Management Team and owns a communications products business. She worked for 15 years in the media as a writer/editor and served in the New Mexico Army National Guard. She joined the wildland fire community in 1996 as a seasonal firefighter assigned to an engine and also worked as a lookout. She remained active in public service on Forest Service administered lands through 2005 working in trail maintenance, visitor liaison services and as an interpretive guide.
Dan Frazee, Dennis Baldridge, Kevin Pfister, Dave Christenson and Jim Hollingsworth served on the information collection team.
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