Beyond the Numbers
Wildland firefighter fatality lists don't tell the whole story. A host of other factors can help leaders uncover trends and reveal future courses of action.Although this look at a narrow window of three fire seasons has fewer than 50 total fatalities to consider, there are some important lessons learned and observations that can be made.
First, there was only one burnover fatality in the period. The reasons could be better training and awareness, quieter than normal fire seasons at the national level, or more safety-conscious fire management under critical fire weather/fire behavior conditions. Whatever the cause, this is a significant improvement over the 64 burnover fatalities that had occurred in the previous 17 years. Continued emphasis on entrapment avoidance in the annual fire refresher training classes is important, as there were 113 fire shelter deployments during 2007-09.
The number of aircraft accidents involving all classes of aircraft gives increased emphasis to the most basic question concerning air operations safety: Is this flight really necessary? We must minimize the risks involved in air operations on wildfires by using only those resources when there are no other feasible alternatives. Is a spike camp or coyote camp better than transporting crews morning and night by helicopter? Is the risk such that heli-mopping is really necessary? Will a load of retardant from a SEAT or multi-engine air tanker really slow the fire's spread, or is it just a "media drop"? Is medical evacuation by air really necessary given the patient's condition?
Vehicle accidents were one of the top causes of firefighter fatalities in 1990-2006, and they continue to be a significant cause in this three-year period. Heavy smoke conditions contributed to five fatalities — smoke will often be a factor on wildfires, and we must ensure that drivers apply the principles of "not over-driving your headlights" in smoke conditions as well. Three individual fatal vehicle accidents killed fire personnel who were returning to their home stations from training or a prescribed burn: one event occurred in mid-afternoon, one occurred at 20:00 hours in darkness and one did not indicate the time of the accident. Multiple-fatality vehicle accidents in the 1990-2006 period occurred with crews going to or returning from an incident. Continued attention to driving-hour limitations, driver fatigue and defensive driving techniques can help reduce these events.
The vehicles involved in these fatal accidents were light trucks rather than heavier engines or tenders — this may reflect the fact that no special training or licensing (such as a commercial driver's license) was required. Two heavy equipment rollover fatalities are not included in the vehicle accident numbers, but they are reminders of the risks of operating such equipment in rugged terrain and on narrow mountain roads.
Heart attacks and other medical conditions continue as a leading cause of firefighter fatalities. Ten fatal events occurred, five of them on the fireground. Of the 10 fatalities, six were volunteer firefighters ranging in age from 45 to 63. An inmate and a 46-year-old prison guard also died of medical conditions. The aging work force, coupled with the national trend toward increased weight and lower fitness levels, make it imperative that a good health screening process is undertaken by all personnel who may be involved in wildfire suppression efforts, regardless of age or affiliation.
Unexpected falling trees and tree-felling activities took three lives in 2007-09. Because of the forest health conditions that exist throughout the western states and the continued need to remove hazardous trees from fire scenes and in wildland-urban interface fringe areas, these deaths may be on an upward trend that requires monitoring. Hazard tree awareness training should be an ongoing part of annual refresher classes.
During the past 20 fire seasons, 359 wildland firefighters have died on the job in spite of the 10 Standard Fire Orders; the 18 Situations that Shout Watch Out; LCES; the work capacity test; aircraft inspections and certifications; leadership training, task books and job aids; and increasing "command emphasis" on safe practices and procedures.
Our challenge for the coming years is to continue using the tools we have, keep up the emphasis that says "no fire is worth dying over" and seek new insights into the root causes of the events that are killing our fellow wildland firefighters across the United States.
Dick Mangan is the owner/president of Blackbull Wildfire Services in Missoula, Mont. He retired in 2000 after more than 30 years with the U.S. Forest Service; his last assignment was Program Leader for Fire, Aviation & Residues at the Missoula Technology & Development Center. He is a qualified Operations Section Chief 1 and Safety Officer 2. Mangan has written two previous Technical Reports on Wildland Firefighter Fatalities in the United States (1999, 2007). He can be contacted at blackbull@bigsky.net.
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